An Unprecedented Ascendancy: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Prospect of a New Era for International Relations by Fiaz, Hassan
An Unprecedented Ascendancy: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and 
the Prospect of a New Era for International Relations 




This paper will explore the significance and unprecedented nature of the Belt and Road 
in International Relations terms, as well as the ways in which China’s assertion of global 
power via the Belt and Road challenges conventional norms and practice in world 
politics. A distinct and valuable dimension will be contributed to the wider sphere of 
relevant literature by not only identifying and assessing the significance of 
regional/global implications wrought by China’s ascendancy, but also critiquing the 
analytical tools that are deployed for this purpose. This will be achieved by outlining 
the ways in which conventions of orthodox International Relations have shaped 
perceptions of this ongoing power shift and the range of responses to it. While a focus 
on various aspects of China’s ascendancy and global engagement will be utilised to 
draw conclusions of value for the broader issues at hand, it is specifically the Belt and 
Road Initiative - China’s flagship global development agenda which represents the 
culmination of its foreign policy strategy - that will serve as the focal theme and point 
of reference for this analysis. The findings of this paper and their repercussions shall be 
laid out in the context of prevailing Western-led global norms and Westphalian 














“China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes, she will move the 
world.”  
Napoleon Bonaparte. 
Chapter I: Introduction, Overview, and Rationale 
 
The political, financial, and civilisational rise of China has come to encapsulate one of 
the 21st Century’s most wide-ranging and pivotal issues for modern international 
relations. Significant, complex, and wide-reaching implications are presented to 
analysts not only in terms of tangible repercussions for global security and geopolitics, 
but also for the very ways in which International Relations (IR) are conducted and 
conceptualised. Literature dedicated to analysing China’s ascendancy has tended to 
utilise established understandings of international actors, norms, institutions, and 
principles as part of a comprehensive explanatory framework.  
However, the bold pace of China’s rise and the ways in which this ascendancy is being 
expressed in innovative and wide-reaching ways stimulates a range of challenges 
against these understandings, to an extent which is arguably unprecedented since the 
end of the Cold War. This paper is guided by the premise that China’s ongoing and 
progressive evolution from regional hegemon to global superpower represents the most 
significant challenge to the durability of a Westphalian global structure, in which the 
‘US-led liberal order’ has reigned supreme since the end of the Second World War, and 
by extension the continued applicability of conventional International Relations 
building-blocks established within this paradigm. At the forefront of these 
developments is China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a multi trillion-dollar developmental 
endeavour that is as epic in its potential for transformative political repercussions as it 
is in economic ambition. Drawing on the deep-rooted symbolism of the ancient Silk 
Road trading route in Chinese historical narrative, the Belt and Road has quickly come 
to represent a broad header encompassing almost all aspects of future Chinese 
engagement abroad. While China has for some time now set forth a range of initiatives, 
activities, and institutions for the purposes of defining the trajectory of its own future, 
the Belt and Road Initiative represents the most significant future determinant of not 
only China’s place in the world, but reciprocally “of the world’s future as it negotiates 
the anticipated rise of China to growing levels of wealth and power” (Macaes 2018, p. 
22 emphasis added). 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative - An Overview 
Although widely considered to be the culmination of China’s ‘Going Out’ strategy, the 
Belt and Road has been variably described as a state-backed plan for global dominance 
via the establishment of alternate institutions (Carrai 2018), a stimulus package for the 
declining national economy (Pantucci and Lain 2017), and an overly ambitious and 
superfluous gambit that will never be realised on the scale that it is imagined (Babones 
2017). Others have even simply dismissed the Belt and Road as an elaborate marketing 
campaign for widespread activity that has already long been in process - i.e. Chinese 
investment sound the world (Lopacinska 2017). With such wildly divergent views 
across the spectrum of International Relations and policymaking, it is clear that the Belt 
and Road is posing questions that are complex in nature, with no clear trajectory or 
definitive precedent to provide obvious answers. 
Formerly referred to as the equally somewhat unassuming ‘One Belt, One Road’ 
(OBOR), the 2013 launch of the Belt and Road Initiative by President Xi Jinping served 
to effectively set out “the direction of future Chinese international leadership” (Macaes 
2018). The ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ is fundamentally connective and integrative in 
nature, consisting of “a network of overland routes and railways, oil and natural gas 
pipelines, arid power grids”, with the broad aim of linking China together with Central 
Asia, Russia and Europe (Macaes 2018, p. 10). The ‘Twenty-first Century Maritime 
Silk Road’ consists of coastal infrastructure and networked ports aimed in two 
directions - through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean towards Europe, and through 
the South China Sea towards the South Pacific (Macaes 2018). To date, 152 nations 
have in some shape or form been tangibly associated with China via the Belt and Road, 
with state elites across the developed and developing world increasingly having to 
consider their own future and place in the world from worldviews which are 
increasingly tied to China’s expansion. However, it currently remains unclear as to what 
ways this ‘partnering’ will manifest in practical terms. The Belt and Road ultimately 
represents the pinnacle strategic initiative of China’s global policy, with immense 
backing in both financial and political terms, to the extent that Beijing has essentially 
fated the Belt and Road to be ‘too big to fail' (Babones 2017, p. 8). The extent of the 
Belt and Road’s ambition and backing is unsurprising when understood as the “concrete 
manifestation of previous visions such as ‘harmonious world' and ‘peaceful 
development’, as well as of Xi’s ‘Chinese dream’ of rejuvenation from national 
humiliation.” (Macaes 2018, pp. 28, 31). 
As a result, the Belt and Road has generated a considerable amount of pontification and 
analysis with regards to China’s place in the world and how the world in turn fits into 
the realms and imagination of China’s ascendancy. The Belt and Road has somewhat 
inevitably drawn comparisons with the US government’s Marshall Plan, initiated in 
1948 to assist Western Europe in rebuilding and modernising after the Second World 
War, with the political aim of quelling the spread of Communism and maintaining a 
degree of ideological homogeneity. However, although there are parallels which can be 
drawn between the Belt and Road and the Marshall Plan in terms of the congruity 
between developmental activity and geopolitical objectives, the scope of the Belt and 
Road goes considerably beyond anything envisioned in the Marshall Plan. The modern-
day equivalent of $100 billion USD that was spent by the US government pales in 
comparison to the 14 trillion USD that the Chinese Communist Party has budgeted for 
the Belt and Road (Feng and Liang 2018, pp. 1.21 -122). Also, the Belt and Road’s 
focus is explicitly global (as opposed to regional) in potential and ambition, with 
Beijing making clear that the Belt and Road is open to all despite its disproportionate 
focus on the Eurasian landmass. In line with this, the ‘cooperation’ that the initiative is 
communicatively premised on has been expressed in fundamentally ‘win-win’ terms. It 
is also important to distinguish that while the US was the dominant global power at the 
time of the Marshall Plan, China is currently on the ascendancy, seeking to impose itself 
against the hegemony of US superpower. As will be explained throughout this paper, 
this has potential implications for International Relations and world order of substantial 
significance. All of this has necessitated an increasingly critical focus on the nature of 
China’s political system, as well as the divergence of many features of Chinese 
governance from liberal values and the ways in which this worldview may be exported 
or emboldened across the world. 
A number of scholars have criticised the conjoining of the Belt and Road’s economic 
appeal and political objectives as amounting to a form of ‘infrastructural-led 
colonialism’ and ‘debt-trap development’. These perspectives explicitly focus on the 
geopolitical objectives that China seeks to achieve through the co-opting of states which 
are geoeconomically subservient. Others have taken a more sanguine approach to 
understanding the Belt and Road, espousing the benefits and necessity of economic, 
technological, and political integration to sustain the next chapter of globalisation, 
particularly across an increasingly integrated ‘Eurasian supercontinent’. These views 
reflect and follow on from a considerable amount of analysis relating to China's long-
standing involvement in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa. These perspectives tend 
to interpret Chinese engagement in apolitical terms while emphasising economic 
advancement and infrastructural development ahead of any potential geopolitical 
ramifications (see for example Dent 2010). The Belt and Road evidently represents a 
complex formulation that necessitates an analysis of the wider systems and structures 
within which it is situated and imagined. 
 
Rationale 
It is pertinent at this stage to assess why the questions and issues associated with China’s 
global ascendancy are exceptional and particularly worthy of analysis. Indeed, modern 
history has fluctuated between periods of multipolarity, bipolarity and unipolarity, all 
of which have reflected the rise and fall of various powerful states, with reduced 
standing in the international sphere usually following domestic stagnation and 
instability, and vice versa (Hart 1976). Why does China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
represent anything particularly novel in the sphere of International Relations? To 
answer this, it is essential to note that what has remained constant since the end of the 
Second World War is the Westphalian system of global order and the dominance of the 
liberal international economic order, also referred to as the US-led liberal international 
order or rules-based order. As a non-Western state with a long and distinct history of 
viewing the world’s structure and order in relation to itself, China symbolically and 
tangibly challenges the orthodoxy of systems, institutions, and norms which derive from 
predominantly Westphalian-based modes of thinking and practice. This is most 
poignant in relation to ideals and principles of state-state interactions, state sovereignty, 
individual rights, global governance and international development. 
China’s rise is particularly interesting for practitioners and students of International 
Relations for the ways in which it encompasses complex questions set in the backdrop 
of both global and regional contexts. Its rivalry with the world’s lone superpower, the 
United States, is rife with paradox and uncertainties. Both states must navigate the 
dilemma of a power-rivalry in which both actors view each other as an existential threat 
to their own growth and dominance and simultaneously as an economic entity with 
which their own economic interests are inextricably intertwined (Yan 2010. pp. 263-
270). The fact that the United States has long assumed the mantle of leadership for this 
international order makes the rise of China even more noteworthy when contrasted  with 
what is perceived to be a global retreat of the United States under the relatively  
isolationist  leadership  of  President  Trump  (Stokes  2018, pp. 133-150). Regionally, 
China’s growing assertion in the Asia Pacific is increasingly contrasted with the 
receding presence, influence and leverage of the United States, with East Asian states 
increasingly prioritising policy and engagement based on Chinese priorities as opposed 
to the regional interests of the United States. 
Although these developments and issues are fundamentally concerned with matters of 
international power in the general sense, it is of crucial significance to understand 
China’s ascendancy in the context of its status as a civilisational state, with a distinctive 
perception of domestic and global governance (Jacques 2012). This presents obvious 
and wide-ranging implications for the institutions and norms which have come to 
underpin the liberal order. Scholars have long argued that institutions and norms of 
international relations reflect the dominion of Western civilisation, given the 
predominant role played by Western states and empires in their conception and global 
permeation (Acharya 2014). Indeed, the normalisation and proliferation of the nation 
state concept itself, the central actor around which conventional international relations 
are constructed, transpired in ways that were inherently tied to the rise of European 
influence. While most of Europe was functioning in a system of Westphalia as early as 
the 17th century, its globalised proliferation beyond the Western world was facilitated 
by the advent of European colonialism. The potential for colonial subservience to 
provide a means of effectively spreading and normalising global ideas perhaps explains 
why the previously discussed depiction of the Belt and Road as a form of ‘infrastructural 
colonialism' has garnered much attention and critique. 
As will be later discussed later in more substantial detail, the Westphalian system of 
global order is centred around particular conceptions of state-state, state-society, and 
state-individual relations. This has facilitated and emboldened particular ideas about the 
world’s functioning, such as those espoused in democratic peace theory. This theory, 
which posits that democratic states are hesitant to engage in armed conflict with other 
recognised democracies, has played a dominant role in global political discourse. The 
theory has not only guided international development strategies (Collier and Rohner 
2008), but has also exerted a formative influence over the functioning of post-war 
International Relations. Partially justifying intervention and overthrowing ruling 
governments based on their anti-democraticness is perhaps the most dramatic 
manifestation of the extent to which the pursuit of global democratisation has had far-
reaching implications for world politics (see Russett 2005 and Weede 2004 for 
comprehensive discussions on this). Liberal democracy and democratic governance, or 
rather the lack thereof, have also served as key barometers by which ‘rogue states’, such 
as Iran and North Korea, are identified and constructed as problems (Saunders 2009). 
In contrast, the civilisational state that China represents (Jacques 2012) is an inherently 
‘illiberal projection’, as it challenges the conception and legitimacy of common 
democratic standards, universal values, and human rights, in favour of principles and 
governance that are particular to the civilisation in question (Kagarlitsy 2014). This is 
especially noteworthy given the propensity for certain states who are engaged in the 
Belt and Road to favour this ideological stance, as in the case of Turkey and the ruling 
party’s pursuit of Ottoman revivalism (Ongur 2014). The growth of populist parties in 
nations as diverse as Hungary, Brazil, and India has been interpreted as being 
symptomatic of liberalism’s global decline and weakened appeal, suggesting that there 
is potential for alternative worldviews to take precedence in both domestic and global 
governance. Recent unrest in Hong Kong and an escalation of suppression in Xinjiang 
represent only the culmination of long-standing friction between the Chinese state and 
peoples within its peripheries, and it is crucial to assess how developing countries 
(particularly those with autocratic leanings and those with fractious demographics) are 
likely to respond to economic opportunities and courting from a state demonstrating a 
notably alternate path to development and governance, alongside diverging notions of 
rights, liberties, and state-society relations. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that this same international system has remained flexible 
enough to accommodate China’s system of governance and distinctive path to 
development, enabling it the means to radically alleviate poverty on an unprecedented 
scale. The ruling party has long been aware that its legitimacy is fundamentally 
predicated on its capacity to effectively improve the lives of its citizenry in material 
terms (Nordin and Weissmann 2018). Until recently, China’s rise was framed in 
predominantly economic contexts - an inevitable consequence of the rapid and 
sustained growth of its economy, with its overtaking of the US as the world ’s largest 
economy by nominal GDP forecast as an impending inevitability. However, it is the 
political leverage afforded by that economic power, in conjunction with the quagmire 
of entangled alliances and rivalries that are catalysed as a result of China’s growing 
ambition, presence, and influence overseas, that require in-depth scrutiny and analysis 
for the purposes of better understanding the implications for global order. 
The Belt and Road has accentuated the significance of developments which have been 
used to discern the trajectory and nature of China’s growing leadership in international 
affairs and global governance. These include the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and various legal and political 
entanglements relating to the South China Sea. These and the Belt and Road Initiative 
are all noted for their capacity to both alter and be altered by the international landscape 
of geopolitics and geoeconomics in “ways which can be hard to pin down” (Garlick 
2016, p. 285). As such, there are inherent difficulties when seeking to account 
empirically for the “tangled complexity of China’s rise in a way which meshes with one 
or more of the theoretical frameworks of academic International Relations” (Garlick 
2016, p. 285). Taking Garlick’s proposition further, this paper will elucidate the ways 
in which China’s expansionism (through the medium of the Belt and Road), has come 
to challenge the very norms and assumptions which those theoretical frameworks are 
based upon. It is ultimately out of the amalgamation of these debates that this paper 
arises with the aim of going beyond surface-level predictions and outcomes, in order to 
assess the ways in which the Belt and Road challenges the very concepts that inform 
this process of analysis and sense-making. 
The preliminary basis of analysis for this paper is drawn from official and unofficial 
sources which enable us to understand how the Belt and Road is expressed (and not 
expressed) in the contemporary discourse of Chinese elites. This discourse provides 
crucial insight into the ways in which Chinese elites interpret and elaborate upon official 
narratives of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and how elites are seeking to 
portray these narratives to foreign audiences. These particular facets of elite discourse 
offer a summation of how the Chinese state is communicating and imagining the Belt 
and Road. This paper will analyse the congruity of this portrayal with academic analyses 
of the Belt and Road both within and outside of China. Use of the term ‘imaginaries’ in 
this paper is drawn  from Fairclough’s (2003) critical discourse analysis, used to “denote 
elements of narratives or discourses” that “not only represent the world as it is (or rather 
is seen to be)”, but are also projective, “representing possible worlds which are different 
from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular 
directions” (Fairclough 2003, p. 124). These imaginaries are thus “elements of wider 
discourses, which we in turn understand as ways of representing aspects of the world—
the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of 
thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world” (Fairclough 2003, p. 124). 
 
The following caveats must be noted throughout this paper’s analysis: 
i) The imaginaries represented here are not reflective of what all Chinese citizens 
think about the Belt and Road. Imaginations of the ‘Silk Road’ and China’s place within 
its modern configuration have long “historical roots and expressions in popular culture, 
art and various social strata, some of which align well with government and elite 
narratives, and some which challenge these more or less directly” (Nordin and 
Weissmann 2018, p. 232). 
ii) These imaginaries should not be understood as necessarily corresponding 
precisely with empirical data and the reality of ‘on the ground activities’ which have 
manifest to date under the heading of the Belt and Road. However, they are important 
“in shaping what happens ‘on the ground’ and are in turn shaped by the success or 
otherwise of concrete activities” (Nordin and Weissmann 2018, p. 232). 
iii) The Belt and Road imaginaries outlined here, although selected for their 
prominence, should not be assumed as covering elite discourse or academic debate in 
their entirety. Rather, this paper and the sources it draws upon should be received as 
just one amalgamated piece of an elementary ‘analytical puzzle’, whose shape is 
constantly evolving and which will continue to be assembled for the foreseeable future. 
 
Having laid out the paper rationale and an overview of the wider scholarly context and 
geopolitical debates relating to the Belt and Road here in Section I, the remainder of 
this paper will be structured in line with the following substantive segments of analysis: 
Section II) This section will assess the nature of China’s power and the extent to which 
it can project this, demonstrating that China has sought to utilise multilateral forums to 
pursue its great power trajectory. It will be argued that the Belt and Road represents a 
defining opportunity for China to dictate and structure its own forms of institution-based 
international cooperation (on its own terms), while simultaneously fostering forms of 
‘geoeconomic hard power’ capable of coercing and influencing states, moving beyond 
conventional notions of military-based hard power. 
Section III) As outlined in this section’s overview, a discursive dissonance within the 
Belt and Road with regards to its economic drivers and political ambitions has 
significantly shaped the ways in which the Belt and Road is understood and imagined. 
The discourse is dominated by perspectives on two seemingly contradictory forms of 
development - namely the enhancement of ‘networked capitalism’ on the one hand and 
the advancement of the ‘Chinese national unit’ on the other. This section will 
demonstrate how these divergent emphasises are in fact mutually supported and 
reinforcing in Belt and Road terms, which challenges the logic behind the ways in which 
the behaviour and interactions of states on the world stage are conventionally 
understood and critiqued. This analysis will be provided in the backdrop of globalised 
market-forces in which private market and centralised state forces and interests are 
increasingly interlinked. 
Section IV) Based on the premise that IR convention and logic is derived from the 
prevailing system within which it is applied, this section will tie together and expand 
upon the previous analysis to assess the impact for world order and IR norms. Particular 
attention will be paid to the nature of the Chinese state and the ruling CCP, as well as 
the ways in which this has informed China’s conception of the world through the 
communications and objectives outlined within the Belt and Road framework. 















‘Ultimate excellence lies not in winning every battle, 
but in defeating the enemy without ever fighting.’ Sun Tzu. 
Chapter II: 
International Institutions and New Forms of Power –  
Belt and Road as the Inevitable Culmination of ‘Chinese-Centric 
Multilateralism’ 
 
In order to understand the significance of the Belt and Road in the wider context of 
China’s ascendancy and its global implications, it is important to reflect upon the 
historical context out of which the Belt & Road and the rationale underpinning it have 
materialised into coordinated strategy and policy. Assessments of Chinese power, 
analysis of what this affords China in terms of position in the world, and questions 
regarding the challenge this presents to traditional understandings of power, all require 
an understanding in the first instance of the different measures and barometers by which 
power in conventional IR terms is measured and assessed. 
From a strictly realist perspective, global powers are capable of exerting military power 
in any part of the world, something that has characterised US hegemony (Gulf War 
1991, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Iraq 2003). China however, despite intensive 
and largely successful efforts to modernise and expand its armed forces, has not yet 
reached such military-based influence outside of its immediate periphery. Keohane 
(1969) makes the case that states at the highest level of the international order are 
‘system determining’, playing a pivotal role in moulding the wider international system. 
Strange (1987) builds upon this idea of ‘system determining’ in her focus on the United 
States’ possession of ‘structural power’ - “the power to choose and shape the structures 
of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, 
their economic enterprises, and (not least) their professional people have to operate” 
(Strange 1987, p. 32). The components of this structural power include “the ability to 
increase or decrease the security of others, to exercise control over production of goods 
and services, to determine the structure of finance and credit, and to have wide-ranging 
influence over ideas, information flows, and knowledge from many areas” (Strange 
1987, p. 33). Being restricted by default from the first of these components (overarching 
military power) has resulted in China's pursuit of great power being predicated on these 
latter conduits of power pursuits, with the Belt and Road representing China’s boldest 
attempt thus far to ‘system-shape’ the global political economy while building and 
consolidating ‘structural power’. 
China’s trajectory towards this pursuit has been a gradual but accelerating process, and 
over the course of the last three decades, China has conducted itself in a way that is 
consistent with the behaviour of both a great power and rising global power. Efforts to 
consolidate an increasing number of global interests alongside its stature within the 
international system have intensified China’s search for “a greater voice in its external 
environment” (Lanteigne 2005, p. 1). In pursuit of this ‘greater voice’, a defining feature 
of China’s foreign policy development in the post-Cold War international system has 
been a shift away from an inherent reluctance to engage with international 
organisations, towards an approach which actively embraces them as effective conduits 
for the fulfilment of international objectives and great power pursuit. China’s 
manoeuvre towards this ‘alternative’ multilateral-driven acquisition of great power 
within an international system characterised by an increasing number of institutions, 
has been driven by two primary mitigating factors which have prevented it from 
traversing ‘traditional’ hard-power-based mutes to great power. The first of these 
barriers relates to the status and stature of the United States as the world’s lone 
superpower after the Cold War, with China essentially lacking the power to balance US 
supremacy unilaterally and incapable of sufficiently gathering allies as a balancing force 
(as had been attempted by the Soviet Union in the 20th Century) (Lanteigne 2005, pp. 
4-5). It is for the preservation and safeguarding of its security status that China has not 
demonstrated a willingness to engage in direct competition with the US and other great 
powers. The second barrier, linked in multi-layered ways to the first, is nuclear 
proliferation, which has transformed the prospect of great power conflict from a means 
of altering the power positions of states within the international system, to a scenario 
that would simply prove to be unacceptably and unfathomably costly to all sides 
involved (Lanteigne 2005, p. 6). China has thus somewhat inevitably maneuvered itself 
into a pursuit of global power which utilises the leverage afforded by international 
institutions and the various modes of cooperation afforded by them. 
Several definitions have been proposed for ‘international institutions’, with Keohane 
(1988, p. 5) defining them as “a general pattern or organisation of an activity or to a 
particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organised.” 
Mearsheimer (1994, p. 72) meanwhile understands institutions as “a set of rules that 
stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other. 
[International institutions] prescribe acceptable forms of state behaviour, and proscribe 
unacceptable forms of state behaviour.” Shaping the international system, structuring 
the global political economy to an extent which influences the way states interact and 
operate, and enhancing its forms of power projection are all lenses from which the Belt 
and Road can be analysed. The question that is thus pertinent to the wider question at 
hand is one regarding the extent to which the Belt and Road represents an evolutionary 
milestone in China’s institutional and multilateral driven path of great power pursuit. It 
is argued here that the Belt and Road does indeed represent that milestone for China's 
great power trajectory, with the initiative providing  a global medium through which 
China can continue its rhetoric of cooperation and multilateral engagement,  while 
maintaining centrality over the ways in which global engagement is structured and the 
principles by which it is governed and maintained. 
 
Beyond Conventional Hard Power: Sticky Power and Geoeconomic Hard Power  
Before going on to assess the extent to which the Belt and Road serves as a structural 
framework for Chinese power ambitions, it is prudent to provide an overview of the 
types of power that China has sought to project on the world system through 
international and Chinese-led frameworks. 
Since its theoretical inception, soft power has been lauded and analysed for its role as a 
strategic and diplomatic tool available to all states, breaking away from the dominance 
of hard power interpretations of the international arrangement of states. However, the 
argument has been made that a distinguishing feature of global powers from non-global 
powers is their ability to project soft power to a considerable degree, in line with what 
Nye (2004, p. 94) understands as “the ability to get desired outcomes because others 
want what you want” and “the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than 
coercion” (Nye 2004, p. 94). The United States has long been at the forefront of soft 
power and projection, with China lagging far behind for the most part. Indeed, ‘Liberal’ 
or ‘Western’ ideals of society and politics, whatever label they may be ascribed and 
through whatever mediums of culture and communication they may be spread, continue 
to hold considerably more worldwide leverage than values and ideals tied to Chinese 
state identity. This is something that has been made abundantly clear to the Chinese 
Communist Pity (CCP) during ongoing protests in Hong Kong, in which support for the 
values of democracy, civil liberties, rule of law, and human rights protections has 
provided a central narrative to counter what the protestors view as the encroachment of 
CCP power and governance (Pubrick 2019, pp. 3-4). A recent survey found only a tiny 
minority of Hong Kong citizens considered themselves ‘Chinese’, representing a sharp 
decrease in identity allegiance from 20 years ago and reflecting the inherent struggle 
that China has in terms of attraction and soft power leverage, even within its own 
peripheries (Hong Kong Public Research Institute: The Economist 2019). The prospect 
of China exerting considerable soft power influence on a global scale appears even more 
unlikely when taking into consideration that China lags behind in soft power terms not 
just globally, but even on a regional scale. South Korea in particular has had 
considerably more success in cultivating a ‘positive’ image of itself, raising its profile 
throughout East Asia and beyond through the ever-growing popularity of its distinctive 
brands of K-pop, K- dramas, sports industry, and the general consolidation of an 
international image based on ‘progressive openness’, creativity, and innovation (Huat 
2012). Contrastingly, indicators suggest that despite general acknowledgment of 
China’s achievements as an economic powerhouse, even large-scale global events such 
as the Beijing Olympics struggled to improve generally negative perceptions of China 
in global terms, and have in fact often reinforced a sense of dissonance between the 
West and China. 
Thus, faced with the prospect of hard-power barriers and a seemingly inherent 
disposition for lacking soft power leverage, China has sought to utilise the main 
competitive advantage that it does have at its disposal - its status as an economic 
behemoth. China has demonstrated how a selective engagement and interaction with 
international institutions can be essential to augmenting power in the international 
system while also providing a means of expanding state power that was previously 
inaccessible to great powers. Subsequently, the question in the context of the Belt and 
Road becomes one of whether China can defy established IR precedent and logic by 
achieving global or superpower status in the absence of military strength that can 
unilaterally exert itself across the world. 
While hard and soft power have a long and established centrality in International 
Relations, much less prominent is the notion of ‘sticky power’, which Mead (2004, p. 
17) defines as “the ability to enmesh other actors within economic linkages to the point 
where any attempts to withdraw would carry large risks and costs”. It is argued here the 
Belt and Road represents an unrivalled platform from which China can seek to combine 
soft power and sticky power to an extent that is unprecedented in International 
Relations. A particularly controversial aspect of the Belt and Road is the perceived 
prevalence of ‘debt-trap diplomacy'. This refers to a form of diplomacy whereby a 
creditor country intentionally extends excessive credit (often in the form of asset-based 
lending, including infrastructure) to a debtor country, with the supposed intention of 
being afforded economic or political concessions once the inevitable point is reached at 
which the debtor country is unable to fulfil its debt obligations. Chinese loans (mainly 
provided for strategic ports) account for 77% of Djibouti’s national debt, whilst it was 
also recently reported that Pakistan now owes more money to Beijing than to the IMF 
(Bloomberg News 2019). These are just two examples of the extent to which debt can 
become a defining factor of international relations. The intertwining of interests to a 
degree in which one becomes subservient to the other is elucidated by the extent to 
which China is able to hold economic leverage over states lured by the prospect of 
development and much needed quick financing. 
During a 2012 interview with Graham Allison, Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore’s first Prime 
Minister 1959-1990) offered a fundamentally different perspective from the then US 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s admission that the concept of global balance of 
power was ‘obsolete’ (Allison 2017, p. 20). Yew instead viewed the concept in terms 
of a ‘fundamental building block in understanding relations between states’, explaining 
that, “In the old concept, balance of power meant largely military power. In today’s 
terms, it is a combination of economic and military, and I think the economic outweighs 
the military” (Yew 2012, cited in Allison 2017, p. 20. emphasis added).  
This new construction of ‘balance of power’ is gaining greater prominence and has been 
labelled as ‘geoeconomics’ - defined as the use of economic instruments (including 
foreign aid, trade, investment, and even cyber-attacks), for the purposes of achieving 
geopolitical objectives (Allison 2017). This concept is explored in detail by Blackwill 
and Harris (201 6, p. 17) who argue that China is “the world’s leading practitioner of 
geoeconomics, but it has also been perhaps the major factor in returning regional or 
global power projection back to an importantly economic (as opposed to political-
military) exercise.” In June 2017, Greece blocked an EU statement at the United Nations 
which was critical of China’s human rights record (Reuters 2017). Despite there being 
little to no military engagement between the two countries, the power of geoeconomics 
as an almost coercive form of power is becoming increasingly clear to observe, and a 
phenomenon which those within the field of IR should pay increasing critical attention 
towards. 
Chinese authorities and state elites have optimistically and unequivocally embraced the 
conception of a world system which articulates economic power relations and 
dependence at the heart of its economy. As such, “the global economy is less a level 
playing field than an organized system in which some countries occupy privileged 
positions and others, such as China, try to rise to these commanding heights” (Macaes 
2018, p. 7). 
 
Situating the Belt and Road within China’s Institution and Multilateral Focused 
Power Pursuit 
Macaes (2018, p. 24) posits that the Belt and Road is “global in nature. Its ruling 
principle is interdependence, a close network of common interests by which every 
country’s development is affected by the development path in other countries.” This 
draws on President Xi’s 2013 speech in Jakarta, delivered to promote the Belt and Road, 
in which the initiative was referred to as a “community of shared destiny” (Macaes 
2018, p. 8). This built upon an expression which has featured in Chinese 
communications since as early as 2007 to describe relations between Taiwan and 
mainland China. This application to China’s relations on a global scale has been 
interpreted as a reformulation or modernisation of the ancient concept of Tianxia, which 
has been successfully proliferated and popularised in recent times by a number of 
scholars, most notably Zhao Tingyang. Zhao’s work is based on the argument that the 
defining characteristic of the modern world is that it remains “a Hobbesian stage of 
chaos, conflict, non co-operation and anarchy”, as opposed to a spectrum of political 
unity (cited in Macaes 2018, p. 54). This reformulation provided a potent means through 
which China could frame political concepts in a way that was distinct from Western and 
American co-opted ideas of global order, and it was thus perhaps an inevitability that 
that Tianxia would come to represent the ideological foundation of the Belt and Road. 
This ‘Tianxian’ basis of ‘a community of shared destiny’ as theory, and the Belt and 
Road as practice, conjoin to form the “dialectical unity of theory and practice, goals and 
paths, value rationality and instrumental rationality” (Macaes 2018, p. 76). “The general 
principle of Tianxia—which literally means All-Under-Heaven or World—is that 
relations between units or actors determine the obligations corresponding to their 
network ties” (Macaes 2018, p. 77). The basis of relations under the purview of Tianxia 
can be perceived of in terms of ‘mutual benefit’ or ‘win-win cooperation’, which once 
established take precedence over individual choices. Western-derived and Westphalians 
modes of association, which are contrastingly based on the autonomy of individual units 
and clearly defined boundaries between Self and Other, are thus excluded from this 
worldview in which no entity can perceive its functioning in isolated terms. These 
individual units “exist in Xi’s community of shared destiny, from which—and contrary 
to the dreams of Western political thought—it is impossible to escape” (Macaes 2018, 
p. 15). The Belt and Road integrates this notion through the assertion that the challenges 
facing China cannot be confronted in isolation but only through relations with other 
individual units in mutually beneficial terms. 
As Xi stated during the ‘Boao Forum for Asia’ in 2015, “only through win-win 
cooperation can we make big and sustainable achievements that are beneficial to all. 
The old mind set of zero-sum game should give way to a new approach of win-win and 
all-win cooperation. The interests of others must be accommodated while pursuing 
one’s own interests, and common development must be promoted while seeking one’s 
own development” (cited in Macaes 2018, p. 34). This should be understood as an 
ideological shift representing a radical and significant development in Chinese foreign 
policy. As the preceding analysis of China’s great power trajectory confirms, Beijing 
has long acknowledged the benefits of economic globalisation. However, Xi’s 
leadership and the ambitions of the Belt and Road represent an embrace of political and 
cultural dimensions of globalisation as an opportunity, in contrast to the suspicion that 
guided its prior approach. Enhancing and facilitating the flow of political and cultural 
influence beyond state boundaries is posited over the creation of new barriers, while the 
Belt and Road even advocates forms of innovation which well-established institutions 
such as the European Union have made limited progress in, such as economic policy 
coordination. Further initiatives indicative of China’s institution-based conception of 
world society and order include the construction of a dispute settlement mechanism, 
constituted of three international commercial courts, which aim to protect the legal 
rights and interests of both Chinese and  foreign parties. A court in Xian will be 
dedicated to dealing with commercial disputes along the Silk Road Economic Belt, a 
court in Shenzhen will deal with cases which rise along the 21st Maritime Silk Road, 
and Beijing will host the headquarters of the ‘Belt and Road court’. This projection of 
‘rule of law’ principles and the new ‘political confidence’ that is represented by these 
developments has inspired “dreams of infusing the global order with Chinese values, 
simultaneously reducing fears of Western cultural imperialism” (Macaes 2018, p. 13). 
China has clearly long pursued a multilateral-focused and institution-based approach to 
its growing clout and presence on the international stage, and the trajectory being 
followed in the Belt and Road should thus be of no surprise. However, what does 
distinguish the Belt and Road in terms of its geopolitical implications is the fact that it 
now demonstrates how China is now “much less afraid of political and cultural 
globalization because it now believes they can be shaped according to a Chinese model” 
(Macaes 2018, p. 13). In 2012, the report for the 18th National Congress of the CPC 
made the case that: “In promoting mutually beneficial cooperation, we should raise 
awareness about human beings sharing a community of common destiny. A country 
should accommodate the legitimate concerns of others when pursuing its own interests; 
and it should promote common development of all countries when advancing its own 
development.” The extent to which the ideological foundation of the Belt and Road has 
been successfully fused within existing institutions and ideals of global governance was 
exemplified in 2017 when a proposition to ‘build a Community of Shared Future for 
Mankind’ became part of a UN and UNSC resolution, while the proposition’s core 
premise of ‘achieving shared growth through discussion and collaboration’ was 
incorporated into the UN General Assembly’s resolution on global governance. 
Under the premise that the Belt and Road embodies and evokes unprecedented 
questions for the field of International Relations, it should necessarily be predicated that 
the Belt and Road itself represents an unprecedented concept. Parallels have naturally 
been drawn to the European Union - “the most significant contemporary example of 
cooperation between states”. However, there are fundamental differences between the 
two. The Belt and Road overlooks the establishment of a body of supranational 
institutions, but reaches the heart of national sovereignty through the projection of state-
relation decision making in which every decision is in principle open to external 
influence. In other words, “national sovereignty is never renounced, but neither is it 
affirmed or consecrated. Tianxia is neither national nor supranational” (Macaes 2018). 
In many ways, it is far from clear what exactly is constituted by the Belt and Road, with 
the name often appearing to represent a catch-all term for Chinese overseas 
development and engagement initiatives. Perhaps, as Macaes (2018) suggests, the Belt 
and Road should be understood by theorists as “a name and little more than a name”, 
but a powerfully symbolic name whose “most obvious advantage is that it brings 
together a number of new, highly significant developments: China’s growing 
international  clout, its need to reshape the international economic system in its image 
and the growing reactions and responses to that project”. Thus, if the Belt and Road is 
to be understood somewhat paradoxically as simultaneously ‘shapeless and highly 
ambitious’, then it would perhaps be more theoretically sound to compare the Belt and 
Road with a geopolitical concept such as that of ‘the West’ and the epochal significance 
it has come to acquire. 
Linking back to the interplay between economic and political forces, from an economic 
perspective, “China will be organizing and leading an increasing share of global supply 
chains, reserving for itself the most valuable segments of production and creating strong 
links of collaboration and infrastructure with other countries , whose main role in the 
system will be to occupy lower value segments.” From a political standpoint, Beijing is 
hoping to benefit from the implementation of a ‘feedback mechanism’, much the same 
way that the West has benefited over the past century - “deeper links of investment, 
infrastructure and trade can be used as leverage to shape relations with other countries 
even more in its favor. The process feeds on itself” (Macaes 2018). The Belt and Road 
ultimately represents a cumulative but distinctively radical shift beyond the concept of 
international institutions towards an ‘international regime’, defined by (Krasner 1983) 
and (Martin 1999) as “the idea of a larger set of political constructions of which 
institutions are a part”. As will be explored in the following chapter, this international 
regime should be viewed as a precursor for a global order infused with Chinese political 














“Only when you know why you have hit the target, can you truly say you have learned 
archery.” 
Guan Yinzi, Warring States Period (475-221 BC) 
Chapter III: 
A Nationalist, Capitalist Fusion: Simultaneously Advancing the Objectives of 
Networked Capitalism and the Chinese National Unit 
 
This section of the paper will describe how seemingly contradictory understandings of 
the Belt and Road outlined in the previous sections are in fact mutually reinforcing. This 
is indicative of a transformation towards a spatialised international landscape in which 
states interact with one another in increasingly fragmented ways. Within this landscape, 
the interplay between state and non-state forces feeds into centralised state objectives 
in more indirect and less predictable ways. These contradictory understandings relate 
to the pursuit of ‘networked capitalism’ in one direction and an advancement of the 
‘Chinese national unit’ in the other. As part of a discursive separation, most existing 
literature on the Belt and Road can be grouped into one of these two distinct categories, 
both of which are rooted in official Chinese documents and both of which reflect 
predominant academic discussions on China’s role in the world. The nature of this 
separation is arguably a reflection of the ways in which capitalist structures have been 
constructed as paradigms in which private for-profit trade and industry activities are 
understood as endeavours distinct from state endeavours in the political and geopolitical 
sense. 
After providing an overview of both discursive categories, the case will be made here 
that rather than representing a contradiction in terms, networked capitalism and the 
national unit are imagined in mutually supporting ways in the context of the Belt and 
Road, and by extension  have the  potential  to be pursued as such. Demonstrations of 
ways in which this potential has already been realised will be provided using case 
studies in which Belt and Road activity has transcended conventional boundaries and 
means of engagement between sending and receiving states. The implications for this 
in IR terms relate to the ways in which Realist, Liberalist, and derivative schools of 
thought understand states to be homogeneous entities interacting in mainly linear and 
direct ways with one another, reflecting prevailing Westphalian order which emphasises 
individual state sovereignty. Central to the conceptions which challenge this orthodoxy 
are the role of private companies driven by capitalist pursuits and a Belt and Road 
perspective of a world in which connectivity between metropolitan ‘nodes’ takes 
precedence over conventional understandings of state-to-state engagement. 
 
Capitalist Endeavour 
The first of these discursive imaginaries is a conceptualization strongly emphasised 
particularly by scholars drawing on Marxist theory or liberal perspectives of economic 
interdependence. This understanding views the Belt and Road as a fundamentally or 
exclusively capitalist endeavour, pursued primarily for the purposes of enriching 
Chinese stakeholders and contributing to the continuation of China’s GDP growth. A 
central theological basis of this understanding relates to the proliferation of the ‘network 
society’ as a metaphorical means of understanding global political economy, in which 
global networks that connect metropolitan regions are increasingly dominant (see 
Castell 2010). The idea of nodes in global networks as a form of ‘spatial configuration’ 
is a significant shift away from the previously dominant perspective of an “allocation 
of resources on the basis of national spaces or ‘surfaces”’ (Nordin and Weissmann 2019, 
p. 235). One of the key reasons for embracing this conception in the Belt and Road 
context is the way in which the ‘five connections’ or ‘five connectivities’ which the 
CCP 2015 vision document prioritises accumulate into “a platform for enhancing the 
flows of capital, goods and consumers (as tourists or students) across  Eurasia”  (Nordin 
and Weissmann 2019, p. 235). These five priorities are listed as: ‘policy coordination, 
facilities connectivity (e.g. infrastructure and communications), unimpeded trade (e.g. 
free trade areas and customs cooperation), financial integration (linking 
internationalization of the renminbi with the establishment of new development banks) 
and a ‘people-to-people bond’ (which is moulded through engagements such as student 
exchanges and tourism).” (CCP Vision Document 2015). 
 
 
Illustration of the collective Belt and Road Initiative - Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (SOURCE: Xinhua in China Daily). It is 
interesting to note in this map how ‘metropolitan nodes’ take precedence over 
demarcated state spaces, indicating the kind of ‘global connectivity’ that China 




The second discursive imaginary is a geostrategic logic emphasised mainly by scholars 
drawing from notions of national identity rooted in constructivist thought, alongside 
realists whose understandings of a balance of power are rooted in ‘national zero-sum 
terms’. This ‘discursive construction of a Sinocentric order’ (Nordin and Weissmann 
2019, p. 236), variably tends to deploy geostrategic language, focuses upon ideas of the 
‘China dream’ and silu jingshen (the ‘Silk Road spirit). It is this narrative that tends to 
draw parallels with the US Marshall Plan.  
The geostrategic logic has been used to explain China’s use of the Belt and Road to 
fulfil its regional ambitions, by for example, diminishing the influence and role of India 
in South Asia and increasing its engagement throughout East Asia to further establish 
its regional presence ahead of the United States. The geostrategic logic also draws upon 
ideas of Chinese leadership and pursuit of superpower status, as part of which the Belt 
and Road is an essential platform through which China can forge alliances, build 
networks and establish global norms for the conduct of international relations. A 
strengthened geostrategic position is viewed as crucial to China’s leverage with regards 
to international issues such as the South China Sea dispute and separatist sentiment in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Thus, the geostrategic logic is as much concerned with the 
CCP’s strength and longevity domestically as it is with China’s position in international 
terms.  
 
Reinterpreting the State and Cross-Border Activity through the Belt and Road’s 
Mutual Reinforcement of Capitalist and Nationalist Motives 
As opposed to diametrically challenging or undermining one another, the Belt and Road 
has enabled the pursuits of the ‘Chinese nationalist unit’ and ‘networked capitalism’ to 
fuse in ways which ultimately “reinforce Chinese government narratives that portray 
China as the new trailblazer of global capitalism, which it will lead better than the 
United States, specifically illustrating and justifying a new Sinocentric order in and 
beyond east Asia” (Nordin and Weissmann 2018, p. 232). Reflective of this, tangible 
and ongoing forms of cross-border activity within the framework of the Belt and Road 
have been subjected to the same discursive separation discussed above, while 
nonetheless suggesting a tangible fusion between the two upon deconstructive and 
holistic analysis. 
Central to both discursive frameworks is the centrality and primacy of the state as an 
autonomous actor understood in singular terms, which engages with corresponding 
actors through coherent strategies and in direct, linear fashion. The process of 
deconstructing this predominance of the state in singular terms is especially significant 
when seeking to understand the ways in which this state-driven capitalism may manifest 
in ways that are unprecedented from IR perspectives and conventional understandings 
of power expansion. Despite divergent perspectives on the ways in which the world is 
ordered, state motives, and conceptions of power, the state has long represented the 
central lens from which crucial issues of geopolitics are understood and explained 
across the broad spectrum of International Relations. It thus naturally follows that 
International Relations exhibits a predominant preoccupation with the “personalities, 
values, and long-range strategic visions of key elite state actors” (Akhter 2018, p. 222). 
 In order to deconstruct this narrative in the Belt and Road context, this section will 
utilise potent case studies from South Asia - a region in China’s immediate periphery 
that has played a formative role in the development of China’s expansionist vision. In 
particular, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPES) is widely perceived of as the 
flagship project of the Belt and Road, while Sri Lanka has for some time been a major 
recipient of Chinese transformative developmental assistance. In critically 
deconstructing China’s engagement with these countries and identifying the spaces, 
actors, and drivers which have shaped the modern paradigm of Sino-Sri Lankan and 
Sino-Pak relations, it will be demonstrated that the Belt and Road challenges 
conventional logic upon which much of International Relations theory is based, 
highlighting a degree of stagnancy through a failure to sufficiently account for globalist 
forces and their transformative power upon states in of themselves, as well as the means 
through which relations between states are constructed and conducted. 
Realist perspectives are centred around a worldview in which functionally identical 
states engage in perennial struggles for power within an inherently anarchical 
environment. Central to realist analyses are the ideas that state ambition grows parallel 
to their power, rapid economic development can shift the balance of power, and power 
itself represents a tangible force (Mearsheimer 1995, p. 91). These narratives lend 
themselves to the long-running saga of a struggle for regional hegemony and global 
influence between rising powers India and China (Hong 2016, p. 26). Within this 
paradigm, smaller and less powerful host states with which China engages possess 
analytical value only in relation to their role in facilitating and manoeuvring power and 
the direction in which it travels (Shambaugh 2005, pp. 95-95). China’s relationships 
with small-power states within and outside of its immediate periphery are thus 
interpreted as an assertion of its growing dominance through the process of resource 
accumulation and economic dependency, alongside the institutionalisation of those 
processes (Callaghan 2016, p. 228). The fact that India has failed to secure its status as 
regional hegemon adds credence to this line of thought, with China provided space 
within which to exploit the lack of regional integration and connectivity. 
It thus appears intuitive to interpret the cautiousness and aversion with which India has 
approached the Belt and Road as reflective of the forces of material power that India is 
competing with, alongside the economic and security repercussions that Indian officials 
foresee being potentially confronted with (Jeganaathan 2017, p. 160). However, this 
stance in isolation is an insufficient premise from which to understand China-India 
relations in the backdrop of China’s expansionist policies. In comparison to views 
rooted in the realist school of thought, liberal-based ideologies place greater emphasis 
on the potential for economic interdependence and networks of institutions to leverage 
power over and between the conduct of other states (Keohane and Nye 1977, pp. 167- 
173). China and India have a long and established relationship as substantial trading 
partners, have demonstrated constructive cooperation with each other in multilateral 
forums, and have participated in joint military exercises. The Indian government even 
went as far as to support China's development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) as part of its international efforts (Yu 2017, p. 366). It is also significant 
that China has specifically pursued diplomatic efforts to engage India and secure its 
buy-in through a Belt and Road narrative centred around the themes of “strategy 
connectivity” and “policy coordination” (Hong 2016, p. 30). With this context in mind, 
an account of China-South Asia relations cannot be wholly explained in terms of hard 
power and the securement of hegemony. A more coherent perspective must give due 
consideration to the power of economic drivers and the gains and losses that arise for 
participant states. In line with this, facilitating the movement of materials and services 
across borders has been identified as one of the Belt and Road’s core functions, for the 
purposes of maintaining production and consumption cycles and sustaining growth of 
the Chinese economy (Yu 2017, p. 356-357). Shipping remains the most cost-efficient 
means of maintaining China’s importation and consumption of a considerable global 
share of “fuels, raw material, and semi-finished goods” (Yu 2017, p. 357). Thus in the 
context of the Belt and Road, China’s expansion of its port network in collaboration 
with countries such as Pakistan, which provides a strategically valuable cargo route to 
China’s western regions, are vital measures in keeping up with the growing demands of 
its progressively affluent population and export-driven economy (Yu 2017, p. 358). 
Pivotal to this sense-making are ideas of ‘grand strategy’ emanating from the central 
actor (China) and the role of participant states as willing and autonomous beneficiaries 
of this coherent integration and connectivity (Hameiri and Jones 2016, p. 73). It is thus 
clear that understandings of both economic and political objectives need to be accounted 
for when assessing the type of engagement that China has made a cornerstone of its 
foreign policy. However, what is lacking from these prevailing perspectives is the ways 
in which the fragmentation of the state plays out in cross-border cooperation and how 
the role of non-state actors and state actors interact to mutually reinforce capitalist 
endeavours and geopolitical ambition. 
Ultimately, the state is indeed the pivotal driver in fiscal and industrial cross-border 
activity, while state elites in sending and receiving countries are the primary means 
through which the fusion of public development, integration, and connectivity are 
negotiated and facilitated (Kataria and Naveed 2014, p. 398-400). However, what the 
Belt and Road brings to the fore in this context is the significance of non-state actors as 
integral shapers of the ways in which state relations are conducted, to an extent in which 
the conceptual assumptions about the autonomy and boundaries of the state are directly 
challenged. This is something that both realist and liberalist schools of thought have 
failed to adequately keep pace with (Hameiri and Jones 2016, p. 76). 
Spatialised Engagement and the Analytical ‘Territorial Trap’ 
Much analysis of China’s engagement via the Belt and Road has been constrained by 
what Agnew (1994, p. 53) describes as a “territorial trap” in analytic terms. This trap 
refers to instances in which fragmented ‘social space’ and ‘state space’ exist as distinct 
entities, but are analytically conflated with one another (Akhter 2018, p. 222). 
Boni (2016, p. 500) asserts that “the development of economic cooperation between 
Pakistan and China has been instrumental in a broader, army-led security vision of 
China-Pakistan relations”, while “policy continuity towards China is a result of a broad-
based consensus among the Pakistani elites”. In line with this, state narratives on Sino-
Pak cooperation have framed logistical infrastructure as fundamentally “connective and 
integrative” in nature (Abid and Ashfaq 2015, pp. 159-163). 
In contrast to ‘state spaces’, Akhter (2018, p. 223) highlights how ‘social spaces’ are 
spaces which state elites can only ever have limited influence and oversight over. 
Akhter (2018, pp. 236-237) further describes how Pakistan’s ‘underdeveloped 
peripheral regions’ have come to represent highly fragmented and dissociated spaces, 
in which anti-state sentiment may in fact intensify in response to the militarisation of 
development projects and the extent to which Pakistani state objectives are tied to 
activity taking place in those regions. The connectivity espoused via the Belt and Road 
also intersects this state space-social space dissonance through the ways in which 
infrastructure and integrative technology may also be used by militant factions and 
separatist groups (Lim 2017, pp. 1-4). Related to this is the extent to which the success 
of China’s global ambitions, as envisioned through the Belt and Road, necessitates 
engagement with non-state and even anti-state actors. In 2018, the Financial Times 
(Bokhari and Stacey 2018) revealed how China has been engaged in covert negotiations 
with separatist militants from Pakistan’s Balochistan region, in order to protect its 
immense infrastructural investments in the region. 
What the Belt and Road brings to the fore in an International Relations context is the 
fact that “state space is never entirely smooth, frictionless, and bereft of any historical 
traces” (Akhter 2018, p. 233). With this in mind, it is perhaps a “multiscalar approach” 
that will best assist us to understand state strategy, market-driven capitalist forces, 
logistical and infrastructure-based globalisation, and disparate social spaces as a tangled 
web of “complex geopolitical forces”. The need to establish this represents a significant 
harbinger for an International Relations field that has for the most part been 
fundamentally centred on the premise that the state represents an “intentional agent 
interacting only with other similarly intentioned state actors” (Akhter 2018, p. 237, 
emphasis added). 
Thus, the ways in which state relations between states are theorised does not sufficiently 
take into account the ways in which cross-border engagement actually manifests itself 
within a particular country. This is something that has been encapsulated in the activities 
of Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) along the Belt and Road route and the ways 
in which they have transitioned from facilitators of policy implementation to fully-
fledged actors which actively influence state policy and the means through which 
relations between states are conducted. 
Sinister examples of this phenomenon include the 2012 revelation that Chinese spies 
had hacked into the UK defence firm BAE Systems to steal data about a $264 billion 
USD fighter jet. Six years later in 2018, it was revealed that China had spied on the 
African Union headquarters built by Chinese companies in Addis Ababa, with servers 
at the headquarters transferring data to Shanghai. This progression from state-sponsored 
espionage to state-espionage facilitated by infrastructure-driven development (in which 
private companies played a key role) shows the particular difficulty in separating state 
and non-state actors. This is poignant in the context of China and its global ambitions, 
particularly given the centrality of infrastructure connectivity and development to the 
Belt and Road strategy.  
The most high-profile contemporary example of the interplay between private 
companies and the Chinese state is the case of Huawei, whose equipment has been 
blocked from the development of 5G mobile networks in a number of states, as a result 
of it being considered a security threat due to perceptions of its close ties with the 
Chinese state. Reflecting fears associated with economic advancement at the expense 
of potentially serious geopolitical repercussions, Timothy Heath, a senior international 
defence research analyst at the RAND Corporation stated that: 
“The threat is legitimate, given the murky links between Huawei and Chinese 
authorities. The Chinese state has the authority to demand tech companies like Huawei 
turn over useful information or provide access to the communications and technologies 
owned and sold by Huawei.” (Washington Post 2019). 
While these two cases are representative of cases where this private-state symbiosis has 
backfired on China, in the case of the Belt and Road this has often proven to be a crucial 
means through which capitalist drivers and nationalist objectives are reinforced as part 
of a complex and interlinked process, as will be discussed below. 
 
Intersecting Interests, Independent Actors: The Convergence of Chinese 
Commercial and Chinese State Objectives in Sri Lanka 
Analysis of Chinese development initiatives and investment-based interactions with Sri 
Lanka has largely followed the following three trajectories: 1) “an instance of economic 
statecraft in which strategic and political ambitions supersede the pursuit of economic 
gains”; 2) a means of “securing resource security in return for aid or development 
programmes”; 3) “an inherent component of a developmental state”, in which the 
government directs and defines the economic activity of for-profit companies in host 
states which require developmental and financial assistance (Brautigam and Xiaoyang 
2012, pp. 800, 801, 802). 
Focusing on the China Harbour Engineering Group’s (CHEG) developmental work in 
Sri Lank, Zhu (2015) discusses how CHEG gained entry to Sri Lanka through China’s 
provision of foreign assistance following the 2004 Tsunami which destroyed significant 
swathes of the country’s public infrastructure. CHEG’s fundamental role at this stage 
was clearly defined and discernible as an implementer of agreements negotiated 
between Chinese and Sri Lankan state elites. However, CHEG’s role in Sri Lanka began 
to evolve parallel to the extent that it was able to autonomously outline initiatives to 
develop state infrastructure in ways that merged with the objectives of Sri Lanka’s 
government, whose interests were guided by the need for rapid and cost-efficient 
development to help pacify civil discontent. One of the most drastic examples of this 
was the huge-scale development of the small coastal town of Hambantota into a major 
international shipping port. The fact that CHEG, in its scope as an independent entity, 
had initiated this process and taken the lead on securing the buy-in of state elites 
demonstrates the blurred and interlinked boundaries between state and non-state actors 
in transnational development and investment activity. In relation to the question at hand, 
there is a clear distinction that must be noted between foreign policy strategy espoused 
by Chinese state officials and CHEG’s capitalist objectives defined by its role as a 
profit-driven private company. Both are driving factors behind the expression of 
developmental activity itself but are manifest and directed in divergent ways. In this 
case, CHEG had transformed itself into taking on a role which was less of a vehicle for 
the Chinese state, and more of a bridge across which Chinese and Sri Lankan objectives 
could converge. CHEG has thus maintained high-level and direct interactions with the 
Sri Lankan state, pursuing its market-driven objectives independently of Chinese 
government financing or instruction (Zhu 2015, p. 8). 
It should not be assumed however that geopolitical state interests will necessarily 
always overlap with the economic and capitalistic interests of market actors. The 
globalised transformation of states into “increasingly fragmented, decentralised and 
internationalised” entities (Hameiri and Jones 2016, p. 73) alongside the agency of 
market actors, means that the trajectory of state engagement and strategy is unlikely to 
be linear and may be expressed in unforeseen and complex ways. Thus, what the Belt 
and Road brings to the fore is the potential for non-state actors to influence international 
relations in significantly more direct and less predictable ways, with the Belt and Road 
being driven by the objectives of private entities as well as the Chinese state. 
Consequently, there are a number of pertinent questions to be asked regarding CCP 
influence in the running of Chinese companies, the extent to which companies exercise 
autonomy at home and abroad, and potential security repercussions arising from the 















“I think it’d be good if people compare Xi’s speech at Davos and President Trump’s 
speech in his inaugural. You’ll see two different worldviews.”  
Steve Bannon. 
Chapter IV: Worldviews 
 
If the essential function and purpose of International Relations is to evaluate, predict 
and rationalise conduct on the world stage between global actors, then the ways in which 
the world and its core components are structured, perceived, and interact with each other 
must form the foundational basis of this theoretical practice. Consequently, the most 
significant and broad-ranging impact in the IR context of this paper relates to the extent 
to which the Belt and Road may facilitate the crystallization of a ‘Chinese world order’. 
Given that this envisioned order is markedly distinctive in character from the 
Westphalian system with its own palpable and historically/geographically distinct roots, 
an overview of the ways in which this order may subvert Westphalia becomes of 
paramount importance. The ways in which the current international system is ordered 
(from which international relations draws its main points of reference) arguably 
represents a substantial reflection of the powers which have dominantly prevailed over 
world politics. Some analysts of the Belt and Road have approached this question from 
the perspective of fulfilling the ‘Chinese Dream’, as part of a marked departure from 
the current system towards an explicitly ‘Chinese World Order’. In addressing these 
possibilities, this section will draw upon from the analysis of the previous sections and 
relate them to the historical context of the Tianxia world structure and the restrictive 
nature of polity pursued by the CCP. This will be done in order to assess the impact of 
China’s utilisation of the Belt and Road as a conduit not only for global leverage, but 
also domestic consolidation of power within its own internal borders. This will 
specifically relate to the potential for a transformed world order which reflects the 
primacy and centrality of the Chinese state, or rather Chinese civilisation in the holistic 
sense. 
 
Westphalia v Centralia: The Domestic Drivers of China’s Foreign Policy 
As part of a comprehensive overview of Chinese order and worldview, or what is termed 
‘Centralia’ for contrasting effect against Westphalia, Wang (2017) describes how 
Chinese history and ‘ecogeography’ has reinforced the political rise of the CCP, which 
has absorbed and expounded the same authoritarian and totalitarian ethos that have 
prevailed throughout much of China’s history. Making reference to the two dynasties 
that were formative in this formation, Wang (2017) describes the political umbrella of 
Chinese civilisation and the CCP as a ‘Qin-Han polity’, which is characterised by a 
constant totalitarian need to sustain itself and maintain ordered hegemony within its 
borders, seeking to achieve this through the consolidation of outside forces into the 
realms of its polity and order. Only through the establishment of a singular socio-
political system – Tianxia (referenced in the previous chapter), can the “oneness, all-
inclusiveness, unity, centrality, and totality of the whole world” be ensured to achieve 
“order, harmony, and to maximise ‘world interests’ and ‘world rights’ rather than the 
inherently divisive and conflicting individual human and group, unit, nation-state rights 
and interests” (Wang, 2017, p. 210). The significance of the fact that these very ‘rights 
and interests’ serve as the core of the Westphalian structure needs little explanation, and 
demonstrates how a Chinese state which embodies this perspective is unlikely to 
embrace an inevitable continuation of the current world structure if it has the sufficient 
means to establish its ‘natural order’. J. Wang (2015), a prominent Chinese scholar of 
international relations went as far as to argue that: “Only if the US respects - and does 
not challenge - China’s basic political system and the rule of the Communist Party, will 
it be able to persuade China to do the same vis a vis America's leadership position in 
the world” (J. Wang 2015). 
According to Christensen (2015, pp. 288-289), the ‘real’ Chinese challenge exists not 
just in the form of “regional security challenges” but also “global governance 
challenges”. This interplay between the Chinese state and global governance is centred 
around a ‘structural tension’ that has “predestined the PRC into endless striving for 
regime survival and security with epic dramas, great uncertainties, and profound 
implications” (Wang 2017, p. 195). At the root of this structural tension is the somewhat 
ironic reality that the Chinese state in its CCP-PRC form has been “created, rescued and 
empowered by external factors and forces” (Wang 2017, p. 195, emphasis added). 
Official state ideology (Marxism-Leninism), foundations of political legitimacy such as 
nationalist rhetoric and state-driven development, and technological advancement all 
represent essential pillars of the modern Chinese state which have been externally 
sourced. The rapid, sustained, and unparalleled growth of China’s economy alongside 
key socio-cultural changes have been facilitated within the framework of international 
trade and finance, to the extent that China has clearly been rewarded for its 
comprehensive integration into the US-led Westphalian global system and structure. A 
contextual and nuanced understanding of the Belt and Road with reference to the 
complex nature of China’s ascendancy thus suggests that it is actually the Western-
centric US-led liberal order that has afforded China the necessary opportunities, 
innovation, and leverage to develop the means of formulating coherent world strategy 
while pursuing its international ambitions. Some have thus posited that the Belt and 
Road should not be taken as a harbinger for a radical departure from this liberal order 
towards an entirely new global system. Scholars of this line of thought assert it is likely 
that instead of upturning the prevailing global system, China will seek to assert itself 
via the Belt and Road as a better alternative to US leadership over a prevailing global 
order that it understands in fundamentally capitalist and free market terms. 
However, this paper makes the case that despite the clear and tangible benefits that the 
Westphalian system and its institutions have afforded the Chinese state, the nature of 
the CPP’s basis for ruling legitimacy and power consolidation means that the fulfilment 
of Tianxia and an external projection of a China Order is a process parallel to the 
maintenance of internal power. The reason for this is the Qin-Han polity, a concept 
coined by Professor Fei-Ling Wang, which has guided the founding, development, and 
guiding principles of the CCP. According to Wang (2017, pp. 39, 46), the Qin-Han 
polity is “a Confucianism-coated Legal[ist] authoritarian or totalitarian autocracy that 
is predestined and compelled” by a “powerful inner logic” to “order and rule the entire 
[known] world . . . in reality or in pretension”. Wang (2017, p. 195) further argues that 
“a Qin-Han polity, whatever its color and decoration or whoever the ruling group, can 
hardly be peaceful and content when there are other uncontrolled and ungoverned yet 
undeniable powers in coexistence and competition.” For a confident, assured, and 
powerful Qin-Han polity, “the China order of the whole known world is the logical and 
prized destiny” (Wang 2017, p. 195). 
Shambaugh (2013, p. 56) concludes that one of the central drivers of Chinese diplomacy 
is to “support the Chinese Communist Party and keep the regime in power.” Indeed, 
this is reflected in the ways in which China has caricatured ‘enemies' and expressed 
disdain for countries and international organisations critical of the CCP, including those 
who would previously be referred to as ‘comrades at arms’. Ultimately, the CCP is 
inseparable from the Chinese state - its future and ambitions are inherently tied to the 
future and ambitions of China to an extent that is simply not feasible in democratic 
states. Established constitutional constraints on the unilateral scope of government via 
rule of law and balance of power mechanisms, serve to prevent abuses of power, limit 
the extent to which governments can pursue policy, and impose time limits on future 
outlook, projects, and strategy. While the rationale and virtues of these constraints are 
well established in political discourse in terms of the purpose they serve for political 
freedom and human liberty, they have ultimately served to provide an advantageous 
leverage to China and the CCP who have pursued and implemented an extremely long-
term and assertive strategy for the fulfilment of its global ambitions. 
 
Situating the Belt and Road in World Order Transition: Reinforcing Interplay 
Between American Isolationism and Chinese Expansionism 
As the US increasingly finds itself in the shadows of China and the regional/global 
alliances that are materialising across Eurasia and Africa, it is becoming increasingly 
unclear as to what extent the current order can preserve itself, especially given the 
centrality of US hegemony and dominance to its very existence. China’s natural starting 
point for the Belt and Road was its immediate neighbourhood, and as Macaes (2018) 
notes, “the state of China’s relations with the rest of the world finds expression, first 
and foremost, in the changing relations between China and its neighbors” … but, “one’s 
neighbors have neighbors of their own, so these relations will have to be extended. The 
Belt and Road is global in nature.” The proposed ‘extension’ of these relations is 
significant in relation to Allison’s (2017, p. 126) analysis that, “Chinese leaders 
recognize that the role the US has played since World War II as the guardian of regional 
stability and security has been essential to the rise of Asia, including China itself. But 
they believe that as the tide that brought the US to Asia recedes, America must leave 
with it.” The immensity of this significance lies in the fact that if China intends to 
proliferate the hegemony, influence, and norms it has established from a regional to 
global scale, then it follows by default that the global presence of the US must decline 
in parallel to China’s ascendancy. However, analysis which interprets this as simply 
representing a change in ‘global leadership’ ignores the historical context and 
civilisational influence out of which Chinese state elites have come to view the world 
and their place within it. 
Having provided an overview of the dissonance between a US-led Westphalia and a 
China-led Centralia, alongside the ways in which the pursuit of the latter serves to 
represent an ultimate destiny for the ruling Chinese Communist Party, it is now 
necessary to assess how the Belt and Road fits into this narrative. If the ‘China dream’ 
as articulated in a 2013 CCP central document is to be understood as an open-ended 
mission, then the Belt and Road marks the most tangible material manifestation of this 
immaterial dream. Tied to this is the leadership of President Xi and the distinctive, 
confident brand with which he has sought to communicate China’s place in the world 
both at home and abroad. One of Xi’s most prominent responsibilities during his term 
as Vice President was oversight of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. Under the same 
theme of internal and external reinforcement discussed above, Xi’s communication was 
as much aimed towards the people of the Chinese Republic as it was to the outside 
world. The conjoining of the CCP’s internal rule and the idea of a global China order 
was made even more inseparable when China removed the presidential two-term limit, 
effectively serving Xi the potential to become ‘President for life'. 
With this in mind, the commitment of President Xi to the Belt and Road, in congruence 
with his belief in the fulfilment of the ‘China dream’, is a combination that requires 
serious contemplation from IR perspectives. Xi’s willingness to take his own leadership 
to new levels is innately tied to his desire for China to embrace new heights of 
leadership, both symbolically and literally. Xi’s tenure has been distinguished from 
recent Chinese leadership by his uncharacteristic openness about China’s coveting of 
regional and global leadership. As such, Xi made clear to take personal ownership for 
having launched the Belt and Road during his address to both the 2017 Belt and Road 
& 2017 World Economic Forums, while the vision document refers to Xi and Premier 
Li Keqiang as providing “high level guidance and facilitation” (CCP Vision Document 
2015). In making clear that, “in advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, China will fully 
leverage the comparative advantages of its various regions”, the Belt and Road 
represents a significant mark of intent and action, beyond old slogans such as the largely 
symbolic and rhetorical “harmonious world” of President Hu Jintao (2003-2013). A 
Chinese academic interviewed for Nordin and Weissmann’s (2017) insightful work on 
this topic, described the Belt and Road as being best understood as “the essence of the 
realisation of the Chinese dream and the rejuvenation of our nation . . . It is the 
framework for foreign policy in the decades to come” (Nordin and Weissmann 2017, p. 
243). 
The CCP’s 2015 vision document repeatedly discusses the fulfilment of its aims in the 
collective terms of “we should”, and while it is unambiguous that China is behind the 
vision itself, it is considerably less clear as to who exactly this collective ‘we' refers to. 
The CCP document states that, “though proposed by China, the Belt and Road Initiative 
is a common aspiration of all countries along their routes”. A contextual and critical 
reading of this will evoke parallels with the paradigm of ‘Centralia’ or Tianxia in which 
the outside world absorbs China’s centrality and its global view of rights and relations. 
Some commentators have understood President Xi’s global communications (such as 
his 2017 World Economic Forum speech) as putting forth the proposition that China is 
best placed to fill the leadership void left by the isolationist approach of the Trump 
administration and political instability across Europe, particularly if world leaders 
desire a continuation of the prevailing free-market capitalist order. Ultimately, if the 
Belt and Road is successfully implemented, then “new Great Power relations will be 
needed or will emerge by default” (Nordin and Weissmann 2019). In particular, 
considerable political unease and disagreement is now prevalent across Europe, with 
the perception being formed that both individual states and the European Union bloc 
must eventually decide between China and the US as part of an almost ‘zero-sum’ 
scenario. The polarised responses to Italy’s recent unequivocal support for the Belt and 
Road Initiative represents just one of many harbingers of this new paradigm.  
 
Eurasia - Battleground for a ‘new era’ of International Relations? 
Within the Belt and Road narrative there exists a dissonance between descriptions of 
the global and opportunities being made available to all, and the actual practical details 
of plans and activities conducted via the Belt and Road, which focus almost exclusively 
on the Eurasian landmass. Emphasising the inextricable web of interactions between 
history, the present, and the future, this centrality of the Eurasian supercontinent in the 
Belt and Road imagination reflects the writings of one of the founding fathers of 
geopolitics over a century ago. Halford Mackinder’s ‘heartland theory’ held that 
whichever power was able to ‘control the geographic core of Eurasia’, would be able to 
rule the world (Mackinder 1904). A growing number of analysts are now beginning to 
identify the form of future world order through the emergence of a converged Eurasia. 
Comments made in 2019 by Russia’s President Putin, referring to his belief that 
liberalism had “become obsolete” (Cheung 2019: BBC News), emphasised the global 
ideological space that has gradually been revealing itself in geopolitical discourse and 
engagements. According to Macaes (2018, p. 2), “what took observers by surprise was 
not that the Eurasian supercontinent emerged from the Cold War as an increasingly 
integrated space, but that it became so not according to a Western model, but rather as 
the stage for many different and conflicting political ideas”. Whether the Tianxian 
system is capable of outflanking competing ideologies remains to be seen. However, if 
it is successful on the scale envisioned by Chinese elites, then the direction of hegemony 
away from the United States towards a more China-centric form of global cooperation 









“The world as we have created it is a process of our thinking. 
 It cannot be changed without changing our thinking.” 
Albert Einstein 
Chapter V: Conclusion and Future Outlook 
 
The Belt and Road represents the clearest indication yet that the modern Chinese 
Republic is experimenting with and implicitly acknowledging a new role which it has 
long coveted - that of a global superpower. Economic growth, extensive trade and 
intensive development have brought with it a number of opportunities to project itself 
as having ‘arrived’ on the world stage, and the Belt and Road now marks the first clear 
indication that China has not only arrived, but is now shaping the scene of world politics 
for decades to come. 
As the nature of the world, its constituent actors, and functioning of the global political 
economy continue to evolve in essential characteristics, it logically follows that the tools 
deployed to understand and explain the international system must be subject to critique. 
This paper has served to directly and indirectly bring to the surface challenges against 
established convention, theory, and practice within the field of International Relations. 
These include notions of power and what can be achieved with different forms of power, 
the congruity between private capitalist and state nationalist interests and pursuits, the 
notion of states as highly fractured and complex spaces, and a scrutiny of the somewhat 
ingrained assumption that because states have benefited from a particular world order 
they will not seek to impose their own characteristics and principles on global 
governance. 
The way that the Belt and Road is communicated and imagined leaves us with crucial 
clues as to the intent and purpose with which China is seeking to engage the world via 
the Belt and Road. The imagery of the Silk Road and China’s centrality within that 
historical narrative, juxtaposed against the modem-day connectivity and integration 
with China at its core, formulate an arguably intentional reference to China’s reclaiming 
of its ‘rightful place’ in the world, or in other words a fulfilment of the ‘Tianxia world 
vision’. For China and its distinctive tradition of global engagement, combined with 
confidence of its place in the world and the status of the external in relation to it, the 
‘century of humiliation’ and period of Westphalian dominance to which it has been 
subjected perhaps represents a mere ‘break’ from the more natural order of global affairs 
to which it is now returning.  
 
What does this mean for the world? 
Chinese state elites and strategists have long referred to the centrality of heping jueqi 
or ‘peaceful rise’ in asserting and communicating China’s ascendancy both to its own 
people and to the wider world. While China has not shown signs of willingness to 
engage in direct military conflict with its great power rivals, scholars and analysts are 
increasingly questioning the feasible sustainability of this peaceful rise. If China is able 
to impact the very foundations of world order and the core building blocks of 
conventional international relations in ways which drastically alter the existing 
international system and rules based order, then it is far from beyond the realms of 
possibility that the ongoing trade war between the US and China may escalate into a 
more serious and damaging form of conflict.  
If this new ‘constellation’ driven by the Belt and Road proves to be successful, then 
those likely to benefit most are the newly integrated megalopolises of Eurasia and to an 
even greater extent the CCP, given that the ultimate purpose of Chinese foreign policy 
is a consolidation of domestic strength. Perhaps more crucially in the context at hand, 
the biggest losers from the development of this new era will be those countries that 
forego or are excluded from the Belt and Road - most notably the United States. This 
again emphasises the new expressions of great power and how its manifestation can co-
opt and supersede rival powers without the use of force, as discussed in the main body 
of the paper. The ways in which economic enmeshment can influence geopolitics is 
particularly profound given the immense size of China’s production and purchasing 
power. Taking the example of Japan and South Korea, despite both states being strong 
allies of the US, the fact that their largest trading partner is China makes it almost 
impossible to conceive that either state will shun China for the sake of aligning with the 
US. This means that the race for power between China and the should be considerably 
distinguished from the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, with 
no possibility of the kind of isolated blocs of alliances that were formed by various 
middle and small powers at that time. If the Belt and Road is successful, then it is likely 
that new forms of alliances and blocs will emerge in much more interconnected ways, 
with a greater emphasis on cohesive integration at the expense of individualised state 
autonomy. 
 
How much is feasible? 
It is of crucial importance to note here that this paper should not be interpreted or 
received as a definitive overview of what the Belt and Road will achieve, nor what the 
Belt and Road will definitively impact. For much of the potential impact espoused in 
this paper, it is simply too early to declare the likelihood of its occurrence. Whilst the 
nature of Trump’s isolationist and ‘America first’ leadership is directly contrasted with 
the global outlook and leadership of the CCP, the fact remains that new leadership at 
the end of Trump’s tenure is in no way guaranteed to continue with the same global 
outlook or trajectory of diplomatic behaviour. Also, much of the Belt and Road’s 
success depends upon the extent to which China can pursue its objectives unimpeded. 
As discussion over China's ambitions grows and states become increasingly wary of the 
costs associated with large-scale Chinese engagement, it is far from guaranteed that the 
Belt and Road will proceed as Chinese elites have envisioned. The intended discursive 
value of this paper should rather be assessed in relation to the analysis and critique of 
questions that the Belt and Road is asking of the international landscape and its 
constituent actors. From this perspective, it is clear that conventional norms and 
assumptions about international relations and world order should be considered far from 
unshakeable, despite the extent to which they have been normalised and accepted by 
the global community. This is of paramount importance for strategists and theorists to 
consider and will only grow in prominence as new and distinct powers continue to 
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